well, april 1st is nearly gone and the internet is still here... conficker's magical doomsday payload didn't materialize - which is good, i would have felt worse if it had...
huh? what? why would i feel bad about such a thing? well it's come to my attention that i may, possibly have contributed to the problem in some small way...
take one autorun worm that employs autoplay social engineering...
add one video that suggests autoplay social engineering was first seen in this worm...
and finally add one blog post published 3 months prior to the discovery of the worm that describes that very feature as a passing remark in the last sentence...
what do you get? a not so great feeling in the pit of my stomach... of course it's probably the height of conceit to imagine that i personally gave this idea to the author(s) of conficker, but autorun worms aren't exactly new in and of themselves so this new behaviour following so close on the heels of my mentioning of it does seem a little bit troubling...
so if i am responsible for that particular feature, my apologies to, well, the entire internet and computer using public... i thought it was an obvious ploy, i assumed it had already been done... it was not my aim to give the bad guys ideas (if anything i'd rather be giving the good guys ideas - if only they'd listen)... i'd like to say that i've come up with safeguards against giving the bad guys ideas in the future, but short of keeping my big yap shut i really can't think of anything...
on the bright side, at least i didn't write and distribute proof of concept attack code that was later used in real malware like some folks i could mention...
devising a framework for thinking about malware and related issues such as viruses, spyware, worms, rootkits, drm, trojans, botnets, keyloggers, droppers, downloaders, rats, adware, spam, stealth, fud, snake oil, and hype...
Showing posts with label conficker. Show all posts
Showing posts with label conficker. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 01, 2009
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
does conficker have a silver lining?
don weber posted an intriguing thought about the massive conficker worm actually making the internet more secure...
he's got some sound logic - it does shine the spotlight on the problem and give people who know what to do an opportunity to convince decision makers to do the right thing and that could certainly make people more secure...
trouble is i made the mistake of saying something similar in the previous decade... technically it was more along the lines of 'it would be good if X were bigger/more damaging because then people would sit up and take notice'... as you can imagine then along came something that was bigger/more damaging and people did sit up and take notice... where's the trouble with that you say? i got what i wanted, right?
wrong... a lot of people were negatively affected for what turned out to be a temporary lesson... i'm sorry to say but one of the observations i've made over the past 19 years of following the malware problem is that people largely do not retain the lessons of the past and thus wind up repeating history over and over again...
this case is likely not going to be any different - while don suggests that the efforts put forth as a result of this mass infestation are going to make future mass infestations harder he neglects to mention that there have been plenty of mass infestations in the past whose cumulative effects should have made mass infestation darn near impossible by now if the effect had any kind of staying power...
but the effect doesn't have staying power, it's short lived... there certainly is a window of opportunity for people to push through smart policy/technology changes, but the window is not large - take advantage of it now while it's still open...
he's got some sound logic - it does shine the spotlight on the problem and give people who know what to do an opportunity to convince decision makers to do the right thing and that could certainly make people more secure...
trouble is i made the mistake of saying something similar in the previous decade... technically it was more along the lines of 'it would be good if X were bigger/more damaging because then people would sit up and take notice'... as you can imagine then along came something that was bigger/more damaging and people did sit up and take notice... where's the trouble with that you say? i got what i wanted, right?
wrong... a lot of people were negatively affected for what turned out to be a temporary lesson... i'm sorry to say but one of the observations i've made over the past 19 years of following the malware problem is that people largely do not retain the lessons of the past and thus wind up repeating history over and over again...
this case is likely not going to be any different - while don suggests that the efforts put forth as a result of this mass infestation are going to make future mass infestations harder he neglects to mention that there have been plenty of mass infestations in the past whose cumulative effects should have made mass infestation darn near impossible by now if the effect had any kind of staying power...
but the effect doesn't have staying power, it's short lived... there certainly is a window of opportunity for people to push through smart policy/technology changes, but the window is not large - take advantage of it now while it's still open...
Tags:
conficker,
don c weber,
security,
worm
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