Showing posts with label bootroot. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bootroot. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 05, 2008

mebroot shouldn't be so scary

there's been a lot of attention paid to mikko hypponen's statement that “You can’t execute any earlier than that” in reference to the execution of the MBR of a mebroot (that bootroot derivative i previously posted about) afflicted system...

the news media must love that sound-byte - it sounds scary, doesn't it? after all, as i said for years in usenet (and fidonet before that), the code that runs first wins - and clearly the MBR runs first... but if you remember back far enough then you'll remember that this is pretty much the same problem we had with the entire class of malware known as boot sector viruses (most of which infected the MBR)...

how did we manage to circumvent that little problem? simple, we booted from known-clean external media (back then it was a floppy, but now it would probably be a cd or some other mass storage medium that can house tools for fixing a windows machine)... as such, we had trusted code executing not before the bad code but instead of it... not really difficult, just a little obscure by today's standards (though still something people should know how to do, even in the absence of mebroot, since old viruses never die)...

Saturday, January 05, 2008

eEye and malware creation ethics

wow, i just got done throwing out a mention to the new MBR stealthkit and now i find out it's pedigree...

folks, it's time you go over your malware researchers with a fine-tooth comb because i don't think anybody in the industry really wants to be responsible for another proof of concept getting into the wild...

that is, unless you're eEye digital security, apparently... not only was it their researchers derek soeder and ryan permeh that created bootroot and presented it at blackhat in 2005, but even as i type eEye is hosting that malware on their website right now...

this is absolutely NOT responsible behaviour and the people who were and are responsible for both the stealthkit and the company should be ashamed of themselves for being part of the problem instead of part of the solution... anti-malware researchers and companies should not be creating and distributing malware - this is so fundamentally wrong i'm actually tongue-tied trying to describe how wrong it is... needless to say i won't be touching anything of theirs with a 10 foot barge pole and others might want to consider the same...

*update* - tyler reguly caught or otherwise helped me see a factual error i made... the stealthkit in the wild is not the exact one developed and distributed by eEye but rather is a modified version of it... that doesn't really change much, however, because they still armed the bad guys...