Friday, September 02, 2016

the anti-virus harm balance

anti-virus software, like all software, has defects. sometimes those defects are functional and manifest in a failure to do something the software was supposed to do. some other times the defects manifest in the software doing something it was never supposed to do, which can have security implications so we classify them as software vulnerabilities. over the years the software vulnerabilities in anti-virus software has been gaining an increasing amount of attention by the security community and industry - so much so that these days there are people in those groups expressing the opinion that, due to the presence of those vulnerabilities, anti-virus software does more harm than good.

the reasoning behind that opinion goes something like this: if anti-virus software has vulnerabilities then it can be attacked, so having anti-virus software installed increases the attack surface of the system and makes it more vulnerable. worse still, anti-virus software is everywhere, in part because of well funded marketing campaigns but also because in some situations it's mandated by law. add to that the old but still very popular opinion that anti-virus software isn't effective anymore and it starts looking like a perfect storm of badness waiting to rain on everyone's parade.

there's a certain delicious irony in the idea that software intended to close avenues of attack actually opens them instead, but as appealing as that irony is, is it really true? certainly each vulnerability does open an avenue of attack, but is it really doing that instead of closing them or is it as well as closing them?

if an anti-virus program stops a particular piece of malware, it's hard to argue that it hasn't closed the avenue of attack that piece of malware represented. it's also hard to argue that anti-virus software doesn't stop any malware - i don't think anyone in the anti-AV camp would try to argue that because it's so demonstrably false (anyone with a malware collection can demonstrate anti-virus software stopping at least one piece of malware). indeed, the people who criticize anti-virus software usually complain not about set of malware stopped by AV being too small but rather that the set of malware stopped by AV doesn't include the malware that matters most (the new stuff).

so, since anti-virus does in fact close avenues of attack, that irony about opening avenues of attack instead of closing them isn't strictly true. but what about the idea that anti-virus software does more harm than good? well, for that to be true anti-virus software would have to open more avenues of attack than it closes. i don't know how many vulnerabilities any given anti-virus product has so i can't give an exact figure of how many avenues of attack are opened. i doubt anyone else can do so either (though i imagine there are some who could give statistical estimates based on the size of the code base). the other side of the coin, however, is one we have much better figures for. the number pieces of malware that better known anti-virus programs stop (and therefore the number of avenues of attack closed) is in the millions if not tens of millions and that number increases by thousands each day. can the number of vulnerabilities in anti-virus software really compare with that?

it's said that windows has 50 million lines of code. if an anti-virus product were comparable (i suspect in reality it would have fewer lines of code) and if that anti-virus product only stops 5 million pieces of malware (i suspect the real number would be higher) then in order for that anti-virus product to do more harm than good it would need to have at least one vulnerability for every 10 lines of code. that would be ridiculously bad software considering such metrics are usually estimated per 1000 lines of code.

now one might argue (in fact i'm sure many will) that those millions of pieces of malware that anti-virus software stops don't really represent actual avenues of attack because for the most part they aren't actually being used anymore. they've been abandoned. counting them as closed avenues of attack isn't realistic. the counter-argument to that, however, is to examine why they were abandoned in the first place. the reason is obvious, they were abandoned because anti-virus software was updated to stop them. the only reason why malware writers continue making new malware instead of resting on their laurels and using existing malware in perpetuity is because once anti-virus software can detect that existing malware it generally stops being a viable avenue of attack. so rather than the abandonment of that malware counting against anti-virus software's record of closing avenues of attack it's actually closer to being AV's figurative body count.

there is still malware out there that anti-virus software hasn't yet stopped, and as that set is continually replenished it's unlikely that anti-virus software will stop all the malware. it has stopped an awful lot so far, however, so the next time someone says anti-virus software does more harm than good (due to it's vulnerabilities) ask them for their figures on the number of vulnerabilities in anti-virus products and see how it compares with the number of things anti-virus software stops. i have a feeling you'll find those people are full of it.

1 comments:

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