even though it wasn't that long ago that i posted a number of scathing criticisms of the stuxnet worm, new revelations about the worm and also some of the discussion in this computer world article that asks "is stuxnet the best malware ever?" (and many others i've seen since starting this post) have prompted me to re-examine my opinion on stuxnet.
there have actually been a number of really good technical analyses of stuxnet, but things seem to fall down when people try to turn their technical analysis into a tactical analysis.
what does stuxnet have?
- 4 0-day exploits
- additional non-0-day exploits
- the ability to determine if it's running on a plant floor vs. a corporate network so that it can avoid using some of those exploits in environments where the 'noise' they produce would be noticed by IPS/IDS
- a windows stealthkit (also erroneously known as a rootkit)
- a SCADA PLC stealthkit
- digital signatures on 2 versions of it's code using private keys stolen from 2 different sources
- a centralized command and control communications channel (now controlled by Symantec)
- a P2P update communications channel
- the ability to alter the way the SCADA system controls a very particular (and as yet unknown) process
- the ability to spread itself over the internal network of an organization via network shares and vulnerabilities
- the ability to spread itself beyond the confines of a particular organization's network using removable media and the 0-day exploit for the LNK vulnerability (and an unorthodox implementation of autorun before the LNK exploit was added)
- at least 3 distinct versions (the one prior to the inclusion of the LNK 0-day, the first version containing the LNK 0-day compiled in march, and a second containing the LNK 0-day compiled in june and using a different digital signature)
- an infection counter to (in theory) limit the spread of the worm
the stealthkits are intended to provide stealth (obviously) so as to keep the window of opportunity for the attack to succeed open longer than it might otherwise be. this implies a persistent presence will be required for the attack to succeed.
the digital signatures on the code also provided some stealth from the heuristic engines of anti-malware products.
the IPS/IDS avoidance also qualifies as a kind of stealth.
the C&C channel (aside from making stuxnet a botnet on top of everything else) implies that the attack is not 100% autonomous. certain actions only happen when stuxnet receives commands to do them. as such, stuxnet will be waiting when it isn't being given commands and this will require a persistent presence.
the update functionality also implies an intent to maintain a persistent presence; and not just persistent over a short term, persistence over a long enough time frame that some part of the attack code becomes no longer fit for use and needs to be updated.
the release of the version with the second digital signature extended the useful lifetime of the signed binaries by several years, as the first was set to expire in june of this year.
as you can see, a considerable number of stuxnet's properties point towards a protracted operation. the payload shows a number of indications that a persistent presence on affected systems would be required for the intended attack scenario to play out as planned.
at the same time, however, the delivery mechanism thoroughly compromises that objective by being noisy and ultimately is the reason the worm and it's significance were uncovered. with each new system a virus tries to infect, the probability that the infection will fail catastrophically (and thereby draw attention to the virus' presence) goes up. while there was a mechanism in place meant to limit the self-replication (and therefore the probability of that catastrophic failure occurring) a simplistic infection counter was obviously not enough to keep the worm from spreading far and wide and drawing attention to itself. you don't take this risk unless you can't be more targeted (or unless you don't know what you're doing).
once the worm was found out, the fact that it was a technical marvel worked entirely against it. if stuxnet had simply been just another dumb autorun worm it probably would have remained in obscurity (and indeed the earlier version that was an autorun worm did remain in obscurity despite having been discovered previously), but because of the novelty of it's execution technique (the LNK 0-day) additional attention was paid to it and the SCADA-targeting payload was discovered and everything snowballed from there.
i have stated previously that i consider stuxnet a failure, and that much hasn't changed. the fact that it's a technical marvel doesn't mean it can't also be a tactical failure. the history of viruses is littered with examples of technically sophisticated viruses that never even made it into the wild while buggy, braindead viruses somehow
stuxnet at least made it into the wild, but the conflicting objectives between it's payload and it's distribution mechanism (one was targeted, the other was not; one was silent and patient, the other was more like a smash and grab) means that if the people behind it haven't already accomplished their objective, it's unlikely they will now. the C&C channel is already lost to them, the P2P channel will almost certainly be monitored for new versions of the worm with new instructions and/or a new C&C channel. the entire population of infected machines they built up is now a complete write-off because they didn't know how to maintain harmony between the distribution mechanism and the payload.
furthermore, since they were still releasing new versions as late as june 14, it stands to reason they had not yet achieved their objective at that point.
to date, siemens have only found 14-15 SCADA systems that have been infected and as i understand it, none have had their PLC's altered. there really doesn't seem to be much evidence to suggest stuxnet's creators achieved their goals.
while there's a lot of speculation floating around that i don't agree with, i am willing to speculate that the people behind stuxnet are relatively new to the world of doing bad things with computers - i don't mean vulnerability reseach, by the way, since they clearly have some talented people in that arena - i'm talking about being new at mounting actual attacks. cybercriminals have adopted a proven strategy of 'keep it simple, stupid' (KISS) and it has served them well. on the other hand the stuxnet creators tried too hard, made their attack too complex, and generally didn't show the same kind of polish or experience at launching a successful targeted attack that cybercriminals have shown.
i think being relatively new at this is actually compatible with the possibility of them state-sponsored. while we often like to attribute supernatural powers to government efforts in the technical arena (ex. NSA's cryptographic capabilities are often believed to be light years beyond what the private sector can do), the US government made it abundantly clear that sometimes (especially when it comes to attacks in cyberspace) that faith is not always well founded. i don't expect nation states to have the experience that cybercriminals do because they aren't out there actually mounting attacks as frequently as cybercriminals are (if they were, the 'pain' suffered as a result of all those attacks would have triggered a war by now).
after being reminded of the US military's incompetence in 2008, i'm now more willing to believe that this failure was the work of a nation state. however, i'm still not completely ruling out other possibilities. while the industrial process altering payload does indeed change this from an issue of espionage to an issue of sabotage, that doesn't (in my mind) rule out rivalry between businesses. certainly legitimate businesses are not generally known for attempting to sabotage their competitors or others, but less legitimate businesses (say those with ties to traditional organized crime) certainly are.
the one piece of speculation i absolutely cannot abide by, however, is the one about the target of the stuxnet worm. the idea that a nation was the target is ridiculous - do you know how easy it would have been to limit the worm to only spread on computers running inside that nation? surely the geniuses behind it could have made the distribution mechanism much more targeted than it was had a nation been the target (or had a nation contained the entire target population). this more recent theory that it was targeted towards a particular iranian nuclear facility means that whoever was behind it was willing to risk causing an environment disaster, so you'd tend to think those who'd have something to lose by being nearby would know better than to try such a thing. one of the most ridiculous ideas is that stuxnet was targeted for a single system, unique in all the world, and that it's got a fingerprint of that system that it's looking for. in order to generate such a fingerprint in the first place, the attackers would need unprecedented access to such a target; the kind of access that would completely obviate the need for an untargeted distribution mechanism.
but people persist on thinking that iran was in some way the target, and i think i know why. it's because people are thinking of stuxnet like it's some sort of military-grade cyber missile. they see a pocket of high infection density and think they're looking at the electronic fallout of a cyber bomb. under these conventional kinetic warfare sorts of analogies you expect the target to be somewhere around the epicenter. but, and i cannot stress this enough, this is the WRONG mindset to use when you're talking about a virus and we are talking about a virus! if you're thinking about this in those sorts of kinetic warfare terms then you're head is in entirely the wrong place (interpret that as you will). computer viruses behave like a disease - stop thinking about ground zero and start thinking about patient zero - stop thinking of blast radius and start thinking about epidemiology. think about how difficult it is to control or even predict the movements of a biological vector in a biological attack. without a an agent friendly to the cause doing the dispersal, you can't know where it's going to go first or most often - and even if you do have a friendly agent doing the dispersal you can't know where the disease will spread to afterward or where it will thrive best.
you cannot tell who or what the target was by looking at where the most infected machines were. that only tells you where the worm enjoyed the most reproductive advantage - and most importantly (as kaspersky's alexander gostev rightly points out) the infection populations change over time. the only way you're going to find out what the target was forensically is by finding the PLC(s) it was designed to alter. then, and only then, will you actually know what the target is - and without knowing who/what the actual target was, you cannot make reasonable guesses about the specific motivations behind the attack, and by extension you cannot infer attribution based on who had the most to gain.
but maybe these questions should be reversed. instead of trying to figure out the likely culprit based on who the target was, perhaps it would be better to track down the culprit and ask them who the target is. the two private keys stolen from two different companies in the same area in taiwan seems unlikely to be a coincidence. someone there is involved - even if their sole involvement was selling keys they stole onto a 3rd party, that gets you a lot closer to the people responsible than searching for PLC needle in a haystack.