my first reaction to hearing these things was something along the lines of:
holy crap, the origins of the US cyber command are a farce!now, don't get me wrong, i think the idea of the US cyber command is probably a good one. but the idea that it was formed because of a run of the mill autorun worm, a profound skills/knowledge deficit (disabling autorun was a security best practice even then and there was a similar incident with NASA earlier that same year so what were their infosec people thinking?), and a hammer&nail mentality (when all you have is a hammer everything looks like a nail, when all you have is military training everything looks like the work of enemy agents) is actually kind of scary.
not only is it scary because of how badly they can blow banal malware incidents out of proportion, but also because in all the investigation and subsequent reorganization to form the cyber command they never seem to have overcome that skills deficit enough to realize their error and get that realization to the top level decision makers. so we're going to have a military body enforcing it's will in cyberspace, developing new and interesting ways of exercising it's authority, but still unable to distinguish between an attack with direct human intent from the actions of an autonomous software agent.
they don't call them viruses just because it sounds cool, folks. these things spread by themselves like a disease. they don't need to be aimed, they don't need someone intentionally helping them along by setting up websites or sending commands or any of that junk. heck, earlier that same year another autorun worm managed to spread to computers on the international space station. you think viruses in space was an intended goal? if it were then it wouldn't have had code to steal online gaming passwords. it boggles my mind how after over 25 years, more than a quarter century, people (even security folks) don't get that computer viruses spread by themselves like a disease without the need for intentional assistance. that's why it's called self-replication.
as such, without clear evidence of intent (and i've yet to hear about any such evidence nearly a month later), occam's razor dictates that we have to assume it wasn't an intentional act by a foreign intelligence agent ($deity help us if the military for the most powerful country in the world see's fit to ignore occam's razor). the supposed foreign agent is most likely imaginary and the military has spent the past 2 years engaging in make-believe. all that time, effort, and money that went into buckshot yankee and the development of the cyber command would have been better spent on overcoming their skills deficit and the institutional issues that allowed that deficit to persist.
that is of course unless the department of defense is actually telling us a partial fiction and the cyber command arose out of early speculation that a foreign power might be involved. i imagine, however, that they'd have a much harder time selling the new budgetary requirements for such a development on speculation alone, so an imaginary foe would have been required, and a virus infecting classified systems would have provided excellent context for selling that story.